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ABSTRACT
Health Care Incentives Under Disability Insurance
This paper examines one of the possible factors which has
contributed to the significant recent growth in the Social
Security Administration's Disability Insurance program: that of
health care incentives under the program.
The examination of health care incentives involves a 2-period,
2-state insurance model under uncertainty which incorporates two
general types of insurance. One form of insurance is disability
insurance, and the other is the individual's "own" insurance or own
risk bearing -- whichis represented by acute care and preventive
care expenditures. The model predicts a positive effect of
disability insurance on acute care, while the extent to which
disability insurance discourages preventive care depends largely
on the effect of preventive care on the price of disability
insurance.
Regression estimates using data from the 1969 Longitudinal
Retirement History Study(LRHS) indicate an elasticity of prescription
drug expenditures (acute care) with respect to benefits of about
.5, and an elasticity of use of X-rays and innoculations(preventive
care) with respect to benefits of about -.004.
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(201) 648-5699I. Introduction
A major characteristic of the Social Security Administration's
Disability Insurance (DI) program has been the significant recent
growth in the program. The number of covered workers under DI
increased from 59.6 million in 1954 to 98.7 million in 1973. Table 1
shows the large increase from 1960-1975 in the amoung of monthly
benefits. DI monthly benefit payments in 1975 were over ten times what
they were in 1960.
Disability is defined under the DI program as an inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically
determinal physical or mental condition that has lasted or is expected
to last for a Continuous period of not less than 12 months or result
in death.' Since the definition of disability is both health (and
work) dependent, this focuses attention on the effectiveness of health
care incentives under the program.
II.Uncertainty, Disability Insurance, and Health Care
If individuals knew with certainty what various "states of
the world" were to be at any point in time, there would be no
role for insurance. In terms of the health care decision, the
individual would choose the optimal level of health care by
equating the marginal gain in terms of increased utility and
present and future earnings capacity to the marginal cost.
Now suppose that there is uncertainty in that the individual
faces a probability distribution of states of the world, and thus
a probability distirubtion of disability and endowed health. Two
alternative responses in the event of uncertainty are: a)"precautionary"TABLE 1
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Source: Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 11, November 1980.-2-
health care and savings and b) disability insurance.
Precautionary care may be considered to be the equivalent
of one's own risk-bearing. This might consist of acute and
preventive care. We would expect this type of behavior in the
case of risk averse persons. These persons might also increase
pre-disability savings in order to protect themselves against
low consumption in "undesirable" states.
Disability insurance is an alternative to precautionary
health care and savings. As a form of social insurance, DI
consists of a transfer of wealth from those with better health
(and fewer losses) to those with poorer health (and greater
losses) up until age 65.2/
Up until now we have assumed that disability is an involuntary
condition for the individual.It can also he considered
voluntary. The decision to become disabled (or apply for benefits)
may depend on factors such as declining stamina and motivation,
assets, and family composition. Also likely to influence the
decision is the structure of the DI program, the net market
wage rate, the existence of private employer disability plans,
and the availability of alternative income maintenance plans.
To the extent that the availability of DI enters the health care
decision of the individual, the efficiency loss from "moral
hazard" or adverse incentives must he balanced against the equity
gains from insurance coverage of the disabled. The following
section examines health care incentives under disability
insurance.-3-
III. Health Care Incentive Under Disability Insurance
A. Insurance Model
In developing our analysis, we posit a model of insurance
demand under uncertainty. In response to uncertainty, disability
insurance is demanded, as well as health care, in the form of
acute care and preventive care. Health care represents the
individual's own risk-bearing or "own insurance".
Assume that there are two time periods, 1 and2." Inany
given period, there is a "had" or "sick" outcome a with probability
TI,anda "good" or "healthy" outcome b with probability (l-ii).
Suppose the individual has a utility function u (.)over
income outcomes which is invariant over time, hut which may vary
between outcomes a and b. That is
u(Y',a)< u(Y',b)
where Y is income. More succinctly, this is saying that there is
"pain and suffering."4"
We define the individual's goods and time constraint as
2p 'X' 2 w'ti+(Ai+DipiM') X w m
(1)
i=l (1+r)' i=1 (1+r)'
=t +t + + (2) w m x
where
PmM =avector of health care expenditures such as acute care,
preventive care, and the premium for disability insurance.
These expenditures are subtracted from asset5ncome A and
disability income D.In the model, O<Pm<l-4-
=avector of expenditures on other goods and services
W =marketwage rate
=totaltime available
=timespent at market work
tm
=timeexpenditure on health care
=timeexpenditures on other goods and services
t =timelost from market and nonmarket activities
A =assetincome
D =disabilityincome, received in the event of a bad
outcome
r =marketinterest rate
Combining constraints (1) and (2) and rearranging terms, we
have:
2ii ii i 2 Y x x M +W1(tm +t'+t ')-A'-D')=E____________(3) 11
(1+r)hl i=l (l+r)'
In (3), the left hand side measures net expenditures, while
the right-hand side measures income if the individual worked
24 hours per day.
The individual's level of health in each period is related to
6/
time lost, t ,by
t =g(H)i=l,2 ;g' <o (4)
where jj is the individual's level, or stock, of health,and a
tilde denotes a random variable. In order to simplify the
analysis, we assume here that health does not affectwages.7"
The gross investment production function for health is
given by
Ii =f'(M',t'; K); f'> 0; f"<O; fiafib (5)-5-
where K is a vector of human capital, genetic and environmental
variables which are parametric to the production function and would
be expected to affect the efficiency of health production I.
In the two period model, we define the level of health in
period 2 (which is common to all outcomes in period 2) as the
(common) level of health in period 1 less any random losses due
to a greater than expected depreciation rate in period 1 plus
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Combining (6) and (7) we obtain:
—2—1
i is —1 (8)
H =H+I
S- H s =a,b
The individual's consumption decision involves maximization
of expected utility. In unconstrained form this may be written
as:
u() =EU=1U(yla)+(l1)(lb)+J(2a)+(1) (y2b)(9)
whereU(Y)<p(Y) for common Y because of "pain and suffering" and
individuals are assume to be risk averse.
In order to derive the first order demand conditions for-6-
disability insurance, acute care, and preventive care, we maximize
(8) subject to constraints (3)-(6) and (8).
B.Demand for Disability Insurance
In our analysis, disability insurance represents a form of
indemnity insurance against potential losses, as opposed to
reimbursement insurance against medical expenses. Disability
insurance involves a net transfer of income from outcome b to
outcome a.
Taking the first order condition with respect to period 1






Note that if the price of insurance is actuarially "fair"
(the marginal rate of substitution between income in the bad state
is independent of the utility function u(.), equilibrium incomes may
not be equal in both states, since U'(Y) may not equal U'(Y) may not
equal '(Y).
C.Demand for Acute Care
We assume here that acute care enters the individual's utility
function in the bade outcome only. Acute care represents "self-
insurance" in the Becker-Ehrlich sense,8" where self-insurance reduces
the size of the potential loss resulting from the bad outcome, but
does not affect the probability distribution of outcomes.-7-
Denoting first period expenditures on acute care as V1 and
the price of acute care as p 1, the first order condition is:






where f =f'(V )and2 =g'(H).Condition(11) implies that in
equilibrium, the marginal cost of acute care weighted by the
probability of a bad outcome in period 1 equals the discounted
marginal benefit from acute care, weighted by the probability of a
bad outcome in period 2.
D.Demand for Preventive Care
We assume that preventive care enters the individual's utility
function in both the good and the bad outcome.
Preventive care represents both "self-insurance" and "self-
protection" in the Becker-Ehrlich sense.1 As well as reducing the
size of potential loss, preventive care also alters the probability
distribution of outcomes, shifting the distribution toward the
favorable outcome.
Denoting first period preventive care expenditure asC1 and
the price of preventive care as c1' the first order condition
with respect to c1 is:
+(1).(y1b)
(y2b) D2PD2 (c2)2 '(Y2a)W22f 1/-
T1+r) (l+r)




Condition (12) implies that in equilibrium, the weighted loss
in utility from expenditures on preventive care plus the increment
in utility due to shifts in probability toward the good outcome
equals the weighted discounted marginal gain due to increased
healthy time in period 2.
E.Incentive Effects
In this section, we examine the incentive effects of
disability insurance in terms of the individual's demand for
health care -- wherehealth care consists of expenditures on acute
care and preventive care.
We make the following propositions:
i) Disability insurance, through an "income" effect, encourages
acute care expenditures.
To see this, substitute the first order condition for
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Inequation (13), disability insurance will decrease1b since
income is transferred from the good outcome to the bad outcome.
If the individual is risk averse in the good outcome, pt(yfl)) will
increase. With all else held constant, the left hand side of (13),
the marginal cost o'f acute care, will fall. Therefore, we would
expect demand for acute care to rise.-9-
ii)Disability insurance will likely discourage preventive
care expenditures, but the ultimate effect will depend
on the effect of preventive care on the price of
disability insurance.
Substituting the first order condition for disability
insurance (1O)into first order condition for preventive care (12),
we have:








The ultimate effect ofdisability insurance on preventive
care will depend on the sum of two effects: a) the effect of
disability insurance on the self-protection aspect of preventive
care, which will be positive in a similar manner to the acute
care case; and b) the effect of disability insurance on the self-
protection aspect of preventive care, which may be positive or
negative.
The second effect is the measure of the extent of "moral
hazard."1 We focus on the moral hazard effect here, assuming for
now that the self insurance aspect of preventive care is constant.
The left-hand side of (14) measures the marginal utility cost
of preventive care, both in terms of own cost, and its effect on
the price of disability insurance. The final two terms of (14)- 10-
measure the .increments in utility from favorable shifts in the
probability distribution in the presense of disability insurance.
This is really posing the question: how productive is preventive
care if disability insurance is available?
We may specify the price of disability insurance as:
p = 11 = 12 (15) D (1-tr.)1
whereA.>1and the the load factor is (x-i). The load factor 1— 1
factor may reflect demand side costs (e.g., application costs)
as well as supply side administrative costs.
The effect of preventive care on the price of disability
insurance may be written as:








where 1 <O.Equatlon (16) measures the marginal gain from
preventive care expenditures in the presence of disability
at.
insurance.We would exoect the decline in p 1 because of <0
D
to be offset by the increase in when disability insurance is
present, thereby leaving the final effect on the price of
disability insurance uncertain.
The effect of disability insurance in the last two terms
in (14) is to reduce the utility gain from preventive care
expenditures. Disability insurance reduces the difference in
income between outomce a and outcome b since it transfers income
from the good to the bad outcome. Given a normal utility function,-11-
the utility gain, which is i C(Ylb)U(Yla)) will be
Cl
decreased. To the extent that the (negative) utility effect
dominates the (positive) price effect, disability insurance
will discourage preventive care as a by product of moral
hazard.
IV. Empirical Results
In empirically testing the insurance model of Section II,
of primary interest is the effect of disability insurance on
expenditures on acute and preventive care, in line with results
derived in the previous sections.
The estimating equations are of the general form:
M =f(D,W,X,u)
(17)
where M is expenditures on health care, D is the amount of
disability insurance purchased (the level of potential benefits),
W is the market wage rate, X is a vector of human capital,
environmental, and socioeconomic variables, and u is an error term
reflecting unobserved variables such as individual tastes and
genetic endowment, measurement error in the endogeneous variables,
and errors in the specification of functional form.
Ideally, we would like to separate M into acute case and
preventive care expenditures. However, most types of health care
are a combination of both, although expenditures such as
hospitalization might be considered acute care.- 12-
Thedata used for estimation are taken from the 1969
original interview sample of the Longitudinal Retirement History
Study(LRHS). The subsample drawn from the LRHS was males aged
58-63 who were eligible for disability benefits based on covered
employment under Social Security.
Table 2 gives definitions for the variables used in the
analysis. BEN is a measure of the individual's potential monthly
benefits from Social Security disability insurance (DI). WAGE is
a measure of the hourly wage rate for the individual. A wage
rate was imputed for non-workers in order to correct for possible
selectivity bias.
The variable WKDIS is a work disability dummy variable which
is intented to serve as a measure of the individual's lagged or
past health status. One would prefer a measure of health from a
past point in time; however, use of the original 1969 LRHS
precludes this. WKDIS does reflect a certain measure of past
health, although it may also reflect a current disability.
The dependent variables with the exception of PRE measure
dollar expenditures in 1968 including the amount covered by
insurance. Since quality is an important element in describing
health care, expenditures as opposed to number of "units" purchased
11/
would seem to be a better measure of health care demand.TABLE 2
Definition of Variables Used in Health Care Equations
Independent Variables
RURAL =dummyvariable equal to 1 if person resides in rural
area code, 0 otherwise
ED =individual'syears of schooling completed
MARRIED =dummyvariable equal 1 if married, 0 otherwise
RACE =dummyvariable equal to 1 if black, 0 otherwise
AGE =ageof individual
HEAD =dummyvariable equal to 1 is head of household, 0
otherwise
HHSIZE =numberof persons in household
COMINSUR =dummyvariable equal to 1 if covered by employer health
plan(such as Blue Cross), 0 otherwise
KIDS =numberof children currently living
SIBS =numberof brothers and sisters of individual
WAGE =hourlywage rate of individual
BEN =potentialmonthly benefits from Social Security disability
insurance, given that the individual is eligible based
on their earnings records as of 1968
WKDIS =dummyvariable equal to 1 if individual reported having
a work limitation of at least 1 year's duration, 0
otherwise
FAM =totalfamily income in 1968
ASSETS =totalnet family assets in 1968
Dependent Variables
DOCBILL =doctor'sbills during 1968 (including amount covered by
insurance)
DRUG =billsfor drug prescriptions during 1968
NON =billsfor nonprescription medicine during 1968
0TH =billsfor other medical services and supplies during 1968TABLE 2 (continued)
HOSBLL =billsfor overnight hospital stays during 1968
PRE =dummyvariable equal to 1 if received, "free medical
services" in 1968 such as X-rays, vaccinations, etc.,
0 otherwise
(A variable prefixed by LN denotes the log of that variable)TABLE 3
Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables Used in Health Care
Expenditure EquationsN =3960




















PRE .17 .38- l-
Least Squares Estimates
Tables 4 and 5 show ordinary least squares estimates of
six health care demand equations.
Table 4 shows the unrestricted OLS estimates, while Table
5 shows estimates using an alternative specification of potential
disability benefits. In this specificatIon, the coefficient on
the log of the wage rate(LNWAGE) is restricted to be of equal
and opposite sign to the coefficient on the log of benefits
(LNBEN).'2'1
There are two major reasons for using this alternative
specification. First, since benefits are a positive function of
past wages covered by Social Security, this variable may be
causing a "wage" effect as opposed to the desired insurance effect.
Therefore, entering wages and benefits in essentially ratio form
(the restriction) helps control for the possible wage effect.
Secondly, the restricted specification for benefits is similar
to that used by authors such as Parsons (1980 a,b).
In the unrestricted estimates of Table 4, the coefficients
on potential disability benefits, LNBEN, are positive and
significant for doctor's bills (LNDRUG). The coefficients are
positive but not significant for the other health care categories.
In Table 5, showing the restricted estimates, the coefficients
on LNBEN are negative and significant for expenditures on
physician services (LNDOCBLL) ,andhills for prescription drugs
(LNDRUG). The coefficient is negative and significant at the
10 per cent level for use of medical services such as X-raysTABLE 4
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Health Care Expenditure Equations for
Males Aged 58—63; Unrestricted (t—statistics in parentheses) N =4563
DependentVariableLNDOCBILL LNDRUG LNNON LNOTH LNHOSBLL
Independent Variables
Intercept —2.8 —2.4 .75 —.60 —.70
(—1.9) (—1.7) (1.2) (—.5) (—.6)
EDUC .02 .01 .002 .04 .03
(1.9) (1.0) (.4) (4.l)** (2.8)**
MARRIED .10 .32 .41 .25 .12
(.8) (2.7)** (74)** (2.3)* (1.1)
RACE .16 .02 .17 -.09 —.13
(1.1) (.1) (2.6) (—.8) (—1.1)
AGE .02 .03 —.008 .006 .007
(1.0) (1.4) (—.9) (.4) (.4)
HEAD .008 .14 .28 -.08 .21
(.02) (.5) (2.4)* (—.3) (1.0)
HHSIZE -.09 -.04 .06 -.037 —.023
(—3.1) (—1.3) (47)** (—1.4) (—.9)
WKDIS 1.4 1.3 .17 .17 .4
(17.3)** (17.8)** (4.7)** (2.4)** (6.1)**
KIDS .02 .008 —.002 .007 .013
(1.1) (.5) (—.3) (.4) (.9)
SIBS -.01 —.02 .0007-.008 .01
(—.7) (—1.3) (.01) (—.6) (.9)
COMINSUR .22 .09 .01 .06 .14
(2.7)** (1.2) (.3) (.9) (2.1)*
LNWAGE .05 .04 —.003 -.016 —.007
(3.3)** (3.2)** (—.5) (—1.3) (—.6)
LNBEN .7 .50 .08 .21 .007
(4.1)** (34)** (1.1) (1.5) (.05)
LNASSETS .1 .11 -.004 .07 —.007
(34)** (4.0)**(.3) (2.8)** (—.3)
LNFAM .02 -.007 .0005 .01 .03
(1.0) (—.4) (.06)(.8) (1.8)
RURAL -.24 -.34 —.14 —.05 —.11
(—3.0)** (—4.6)**(_4.l)**(—.7) (—1.7)
R2 .0862 .0907 .0369 .0199 .0145TABLE 4




Intercept -.14 R2 0.189
(—.6)
**denotessignificant at 1 percent level
EDUC .002
(1.2)





























Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Health Care Expenditure Equations for Males
Aged 58-63; Restricted (Coefficient on LNWAGE Equals Minus Coefficient on LNBEN)
(t—statistics in parentheses) N =4563
Dependent Variable LNDOCBILL LNDRTJG LNNON LNOTH LNHOSBLL
independentVariables
Intercept .61 .19 1.1 .34 —.7
.5) (.2) (2.0)**(.3) (—.7)
EDUC .03 .01 .003 .04 .03












































































































































restriction 4•4** 3.6** 1.4 —.002
.0822 .0880 .0367 .0194 .0145TABLE 5
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Health Care Expenditure Equations for Males
Aged 58-63; Restricted (Continued)
DependentVariable pp
IndependentVariables





(.4) **denotessignificance at the 1percent
levelon a two-tailed test
RACE .11
(4.8)** *denotessignificance at the 5 per cent

























andinnoculations(PRE). The coefficients are insignificant for
the other three health care categories.
A t-test was performed to test the null hypothesis that
where 1is the coefficient on wages and2 is the
coefficient on benefits. The low t-values for LNNON, LNOTH,
LNHOSBLL, and PRE does not lead us to rejection of the null
hypothesis(the restriction), while the high t-values for LNDOCBLL
and LNIJRIJG would suggest rejection of the null hypothesis.
The results indicate the expected positive effect of
disability insurance on acute-care oriented expenditures such as
prescription drugs. The elasticity of drug prescription
expenditures with respect to benefits was found to be about .5
from Table 4.
The results also indicated (less strongly) a negative effect
of disability insurance on preventive care oriented expenditures
such as X-rays and innoculations(PRE). This suggests possible
moral hazard effects. The estimates from Table 5 indicated an
elasticity of use of X-rays and innoculations with respect to
benefits of about -.004.-15-
V. Conclusion
We have examined one possible factor which has contributed
to the significant recent growth in the Social Security Disability
Insurance(DI) program: that of health care incentives in the
presence of disability insurance.
The examination of health care incentives involved a 2-period,
2-state insurance model under uncertainty which incorporated two
eneral types of insurance-disability insurance and the individual's
"own" insurance or own risk-bearing. Own insurance was represented
by the individual's expenditure on health care goods and services.
These expenditures were of two distinct types --acutecare and
preventive care. The theoretical model predicted that disability
insurance had a positive effect on acute care, while the extent
to which disability insurance discouraged preventive care depended
largely on the effect of preventive care on the price of disability
insurance.
Ordinary least squares regressions for the health care demand
equations indicated a positive effect of disability benefits on
acute-oriented care (prescription drugs) and a negative effect on
preventive oriented care (X-rays and innoculations). The
regression coefficients indicated an elasticity of expenditures on
prescription drugs with respect to benefits of about .5, andand
elasticity of use of X-rays and innoculations with respect to
benefits of about -.004.
From a social policy standpoint, the health care effects
suggest only minor adverse incentives and efficiency lossesin-16-
terms of individual expenditures on health care inputs. Therefore,
from a microeconomic point of view, any health care efficiency
losses may well be offset by an improvement in the position of
disabled persons both in terms of absolute and relative income.NOTES
1/ From Social Security Handbook, 1974.
2/At age 65, Disability Insurance reverts to retirement
insurance under Social Security.
3/The model could be extended to a multi-period, multi-state
model. However, the results remain basically the same.
Also, we assume that the individual lives through period 2,
although the outcome in periods 1 and 2 will affect the
future probability of death.
4/For a discussion of the pain and suffering assumption, see
-1 (1(7 i1taLL afl¼ ij::,,:.;fl L±/ U).
5/This assumption is also made by Shavell (1979).
6/We may define time lost,t,,bytQ =+k;where is the
expected loss of market and nonmrket time, and k is a
stochastic term where k>O with probability n, and k0
with probability (1-n).
7/This is the assumption made by Grossman (1972). Authors
such as Taubman and Bartel (1979) have decomposed the effect
of health on earnings into a labor supply a wage effect.
8/See Becker and Ehrlich (1972) for a discussion of market
insurance, self-insurance and self-protection.
9/ Ibid.
10/ As Arrow (1962) states, "One of the limits which has been much
stressed in the insurance literature is the effect of insurance
on incentives" (p.961). Mehr and Commack (1966) describe moral
hazard as a subjective characteristic of the insured that increases
that probability of a loss" (p.174). Rea (1981) in his article
dealing with workmen's compensation and occupational safety
describes moral hazard as a) the difficulty for the employer
in monitoring the precautions taken by employees; b) an inability
of the workmen's compensation board or insurance carrier to
monitor employer's or employee's precautions, and c) the inability
of the insurance carrier to monitor the extent of injury.
We would expect the general problem of monitoring to be especially
great in the case of a large public insurance mechanism such as
Social Security Disability Insurance.-2-
NOTE S
11/ Expenditures are used as a measure of health care by
Grossman (1972) and Menefee (1981) among others. Although
PRE denotes "free medical services" as worded in theLRHS
survey, there still may be time costsinvolved.
12/ The double-log form used for the demand equationsin Tables
4 and S showed a better fit (higher R-squared) foralmost
all expenditure categories, than did the linearform.REFERENCES
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